Nelson v. Logan Motor Sales, Inc.: Providing Damages for Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability by Cicconi, Chad A.
Volume 92 Issue 2 Article 5 
January 1990 
Nelson v. Logan Motor Sales, Inc.: Providing Damages for Breach 
of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability 
Chad A. Cicconi 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Contracts Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Chad A. Cicconi, Nelson v. Logan Motor Sales, Inc.: Providing Damages for Breach of the Implied Warranty 
of Merchantability, 92 W. Va. L. Rev. (1990). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss2/5 
This Student Work is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research 
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The 
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
NELSON v. LOGAN MOTOR SALES, INC.:
PROVIDING DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF THE
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 427
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......................................... 429
III. PRIOR LAW .......................................................... 430
A. Purchaser's Testimony as to Value of Goods
R eceived ........................................................ 430
B. Role of Repair Costs in Determining Damages .... 431
1. Difference in Market Values ....................... 432
2. Damages Under "Special Circumstances" ..... 433
IV. ANALYSIS OF NELSON .............................................. 434
A. Plaintiff's Testimony as to Value of the Goods: Prior
Law Sustained ................................................ 434
B. Role of Repair Costs in Determining Damages ...... 435
C. Comparison to Other Jurisdictions ..................... 437
1. Plaintiff's Testimony .................................. 437
2. Role of Repair Costs ................................. 437
V . CONCLUSION .......................................................... 438
I. INTRODUCTION
The case of Nelson v. Logan Motor Sales, Inc.' involves the issue
of proving damages for breach of the implied warranty of mer-
chantability. An implied warranty of merchantability is required by
the Uniform Commercial Code and has been adopted as part of the
West Virginia Code. 2 When a merchant enters into a contract of
sale, an implied warranty of merchantability arises by operation of
law. 3 The implied warranty assures the purchaser that the goods (a)
1. 370 S.E.2d 734 (W. Va. 1988).
2. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-314 (1963).
3. Id.
1
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"would pass without objection in trade," and (b) "are fit for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. ' 4 Thus, when an
auto dealer contracts to sell an auto, an implied warranty of mer-
chantability arises to assure the buyer that the auto is fit for the
ordinary purpose for which it is to be used. In other words, the
seller impliedly warrants that the auto is fit to be driven.
If the seller breaches the implied warranty of merchantability by
selling goods that are not fit for the ordinary purpose for which
they are normally used, the buyer then has a cause of action against
the seller for breach of warranty.5 The damages for such a breach
are governed by Chapter 46, Article 2, Section 714 of the West
Virginia Code, and are determined by subtracting the market value
of the goods received from the market value of the same goods,
had they been as warranted.
6
The cases discussed in this comment deal with how to determine
the difference in the market values, and what evidence should be
used to do so. Prior to Nelson, the law in West Virginia was in-
consistent as to how one should use repair costs to show damages
under the implied warranty of merchantability. Nelson made clear
exactly how a plaintiff's repair costs can be used to show damages
under Chapter 46, Article 2, Section 714 of the West Virginia Code.
The types of evidence discussed in Nelson are: (1) the plaintiff's
own testimony as to the value of the accepted goods, and (2) the
plaintiff's repair costs. 7 Prior West Virginia law will be discussed
separately. The law in regard to the plaintiff's testimony will not
be dealt with in depth, since Nelson made no change to the law in
that area. The main focus of this comment will be on how Nelson
changed the way repair costs can be used under Chapter 46, Article
2, Section 714 of the West Virginia Code to show damages for
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-714 (1963).
7. Nelson, 370 S.E.2d at 734 (W. Va. 1988).
[Vol, 92
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff, John P. Nelson, originally bought a used car from
Logan Motor Sales, Inc., for $3,500.8 Apparently, soon after the
purchase, Mr. Nelson began to experience problems with the auto.9
He had the automobile's transmission repaired several times, but it
eventually became too difficult to drive, 0 and Mr. Nelson ceased
using the car one year after its purchase." Therefore, Mr. Nelson
stopped making payments on the auto loan and brought suit against
Logan Motor Sales, Inc., in the circuit court of Logan County, West
Virginia. 12 The action alleged breach of the implied warranty of mer-
chantability. 3 Logan Motor Sales, Inc., filed a counterclaim against
Nelson for the unpaid portion of the original purchase price.
14
At trial, both parties agreed that the original purchase price for
the auto had been $3,500 and that the purchase price was the au-
tomobile's value, had it been as warranted. 5 The plaintiff attempted
to introduce repair costs to prove damages for the defendant's breach
of the implied warranty of merchantability. 6 The trial court ruled
that repair costs were special damages which had not been plead by
the plaintiff and excluded them from the evidence. 7 Subsequently,
the plaintiff testified that the auto was repaired several times after
he obtained it, but the automobile nevertheless became too difficult
to drive. 8 The defendant introduced the balance due on the note
for the auto loan, in support of it's counterclaim for $1,992.13.19
The jury returned a verdict of $3,400 for the plaintiff, and
awarded nothing to the defendant on its counterclaim. 20 The trial




12. Id. at 735.
13. Id.
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court, on defendant's motion, set aside the verdict for the plaintiff
and awarded the defendant the full amount on its counterclaim.
2'
The plaintiff appealed the trial court's decision.
On appeal, the plaintiff alleged two errors on the part of the
trial court. 22 First, the plaintiff argued that the jury verdict should
not have been set aside, since the jury could properly have found
that the car was worthless from the plaintiff's own testimony. 23 Sec-
ond, the plaintiff argued that the repair bills should have been ad-
mitted into evidence as valid proof of general damages under Chapter
46, Article 2, Section 714 of the West Virginia Code. 24
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the plain-
tiff could use repair costs to prove the market value difference under




A. Purchaser's Testimony as to Value of Goods Received
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals established the
general rule as to the admissibility and weight of the plaintiff's own
testimony about the value of goods in two West Virginia cases:
Spencer v. Steinbrecher,27 and Royal Furniture Co. v. City of Mor-
gantown.2
8
In Spencer, the plaintiff sued for unlawful conversion of an au-
tomobile. 29 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that:
21. Id.
22. Id. at 735-36.
23. Id. at 735.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 737-38.
26. Id. at 738.
27. 152 W. Va. 490, 164 S.E.2d 710 (1968).
28. 164 W. Va. 400, 263 S.E.2d 878 (1980).
29. Spencer, 152 W. Va. at 491, 164 S.E.2d at 712. The plaintiff, after an auto accident, took
her car to the defendant's repair shop and agreed to have the defendant effect repairs. Since the
plaintiff did not have the money, a finance plan was agreed upon by which the plaintiff would pay
for the repairs over a period of some months. Some time later, when the plaintiff attempted to locate
[Vol. 92
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[t]here is no reason why an owner cannot testify as to values of his own personal
property, but he must, in order to avoid speculation, have enough experience to
know values and be able to tell why, so the more frequent method of proof is
to have the value testimony produced by persons experienced with the type of
property involved.-
In Royal Furniture, the owners of a furniture store sued the city
of Morgantown for damages to stock caused by water which escaped
from one of the city's water lines." After a verdict for the plaintiffs
at trial, the defendant appealed, alleging that the plaintiffs' testi-
mony as to the amount of the damage and the value of the mer-
chandise was not sufficient to establish the amount of damages.
3 2
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that since the
plaintiffs were prominent merchants for many years, they were cer-
tainly qualified to give competent testimony as to the value of their
merchandise. 33
The foregoing two cases illustrate the general rule that the plain-
tiff's own testimony as to the value of goods is admissible. However,
unless the plaintiff has some level of expertise in dealing with goods
of that type, the testimony will be insufficient, in the absence of
some other evidence, to establish the value of the goods in question.
B. Role of Repair Costs in Determining Damages
Prior to Nelson, repair costs could be used in either one of two
ways when attempting to prove damages for breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability. One way was to use repair costs to
prove special damages, i.e., consequential damages caused by the
seller's breach. When used in this way, the damages must be plead
specifically. Another way was to use repair costs under the "special
her auto, she discovered that the defendant had sold the auto under a distress warrant. She then
sued the defendant for unlawful conversion. During the trial, the plaintiff testified that she "imagined"
that her car was worth a certain amount. After a favorable ruling for the plaintiff in the trial court,
the defendant appealed, alleging, among other errors, that the plaintiff's testimony as to the value
of her auto was not sufficient to establish the actual value of the auto. Id. at 491-96, 164 S.E.2d at
712-15.
30. Id. at 497, 164 S.E.2d at 715.
31. Royal Furniture, 164 W. Va. at 402, 263 S.E.2d at 880.
32. Id. at 407, 263 S.E.2d at 882.
33. Id. at 407, 263 S.E.2d at 883.
1990]
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circumstances" provision found in Chapter 46, Article 2, Section
714 of the West Virginia Code. In order to use repair costs in this
way, the court must determine that "special circumstances" warrant
some other measure of damages (possibly the plaintiff's repair costs).
The idea that repair costs could be used to show general damages
for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability is not new.
Although the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has never
specifically so held, there is some support in dicta from prior cases
that repair costs can be used to determine the difference in market
value promised and market value received under the general damages
formula of Chapter 46, Article 2, Section 714 of the West Virginia
Code.
1. Difference in Market Values
In Spencer, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated
in dictum that "[f]requently, the cost of repairs may be equal to
the difference in market values." ' 34 The Spencer court's dictum in-
dicated that even as far back as 1968, the court considered the use
of repair bills as a yardstick for general damages under Chapter 46,
Article 2, Section 714 of the West Virginia Code.
In an earlier case, Payne v. Valley Motor Sales, Inc. ,3 the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals discussed how to prove the dif-
ference between market value and market value as warranted. The
court suggested that "a skilled mechanic, familiar with an auto-
mobile of a particular make, can testify about its value after making
an examination of it or parts thereof.' '6 A mechanic's testimony
as to the difference between the market values is not exactly the
same thing as a repair bill, but the two are very similar. In each
case, a mechanic or someone familiar with the values and repair of
autos must examine the car.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has also allowed
repair bills to be used to prove damages in several other cases, with-
34. Spencer, 152 W. Va. at 497, 164 S.E. at 715.
35. 146 W. Va. 1063, 124 S.E.2d 622 (1962).
36. Id. at 1069, 124 S.E.2d at 626.
[Vol. 92
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out explicitly indicating that repair bills are a valid and proper way
to measure general damages.
In Hardman Trucking, Inc. v. Poling Trucking Co.," the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was faced with the task of de-
termining the difference in market values of goods before and after
an accident negligently caused by the defendant. In its analysis of
how the parties could show the difference in market values, the court
allowed repair costs to be used as the measure of damages.3" To
support its ruling, the Hardman court cited its prior decision in
Jarrett v. E. L. Harper & Son, Inc.39 Jarrett involved negligent dam-
age to real property. The Jarrett court allowed repair costs to be
used to determine the difference between the market value of the
property before an accident and the value after an accident.
Neither Jarrett nor Hardman involve damages for breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability. However, both cases illustrate
instances where the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals used
repair costs to measure the difference in market values.
2. Damages Under "Special Circumstances"
In Mountaineer Contractors, Inc. v. Mountain State Mack, Inc.,40
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals considered damages
for breach of warranty. The court once again allowed repair costs
to be introduced to prove damages, but justified this use by citing
the special circumstances provision of Chapter 46, Article 2, Section
714 of the West Virginia Code. In Mountaineer Contractors, the
goods in question were certain coal mining and construction equip-
ment which were at the time extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to obtain. 4' The court held that the facts constituted sufficient "spe-
cial circumstances" to warrant not using the standard damages for-
mula of market value as warranted minus market value as received.
37. 346 S.E.2d 551 (w. Va. 1986).
38. Id. at 554.
39. 160 W. Va. 399, 235 S.E.2d 362 (1977).
40. 165 W. Va. 292, 268 S.E.2d 886 (1979).
41. Id. at 303, 268 S.E.2d at 893.
1990]
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Therefore, the court allowed the plaintiff to recover repair costs. 42
Using repair costs to determine damages in Mountaineer Contractors
does not necessarily apply to a situation in which the general dam-
ages formula is being utilized. It is another instance where the Su-
preme Court of Appeals used the plaintiff's repair cost as the correct
measure of damages.
The case of Easley Ford Sales, Inc. v. Solomon43 involved a
breach of express and implied warranties. In Easley, evidence of the
costs of repairing a truck was admitted into evidence without dis-
cussion. Easley was the first case in which repair costs were used
as proof of general damages for breach of implied warranty of mer-
chantability. Although no explanation was given, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals considered the plaintiff's repair costs to
be the proper measure of damages.
The foregoing cases indicate that the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals has been moving toward allowing repair costs to be used
as an indicator of the difference in market values to show general
damages under the implied warranty of merchantability required un-
der Chapter 46, Article 2, Section 714 of the West Virginia Code.
IV. ANALYSIS OF NELSON
A. Plaintiff's Testimony as to the Value of the Goods: Prior
Law Sustained
As to the plaintiff's testimony, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals followed Spencer"4 and Royal Furniture.45 The Nelson
court held that the plaintiff's testimony as to the value of the goods
as accepted was admissible but was insufficient to support a finding
of the value of the goods without other evidence. 46 Citing Spencer
and Royal Furniture,47 the Nelson court restated the proposition that
42. Id. at 304, 268 S.E.2d at 894.
43. 167 W. Va. 891, 280 S.E.2d 718 (1981).
44. Spencer v. Steinbrecher, 152 W. Va. 490, 164 S.E.2d 710 (1968).
45. Royal Furniture v. City of Morgantown, 164 W. Va. 400, 263 S.E.2d 878 (1980).
46. Nelson, 370 S.E.2d at 736.
47. Spencer v. Steinbrecher, 152 W. Va. 490, 164 S.E.2d 710 (1968); Royal Furniture v. City
of Morgantown, 164 W. Va. 400, 263 S.E.2d 878 (1980).
[Vol. 92
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"[flay witnesses may express their opinion as to the value of personal
or real property, as long as the opinion is not speculative or con-
jectural. 48 As an example of speculative lay testimony, the Nelson
court quoted language from Spencer wherein the plaintiff testified
that she "imagined" that her car was worth a certain amount.
The plaintiff's testimony was not sufficient to meet the burden
of proof as to the value of the car as received. 49 Although the plain-
tiff's testimony was admissible, the plaintiff had no special expe-
rience in dealing with automobiles, as the plaintiffs did in Royal
Furniture. Consequently, the Nelson court held that the plaintiff's
testimony was insufficient to support the jury's verdict for the plain-
tiff.50 The Nelson court's holding as to the plaintiff's testimony makes
no change in the law of this jurisdiction.
B. Role of Repair Costs in Determining Damages
Before Nelson, repair costs could be used to show either "special
damages" or to measure damages under the "special circumstances"
provision of Chapter 46, Article 2, Section 714 of the West Virginia
Code.51 In Nelson, however, the court extended the law and allowed
repair costs to be used as proof of general damages under the for-
mula for general damages found in the UCC.5 2
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals disagreed with the
trial court's ruling that the repair costs were to be considered as
special damages. The Supreme Court of Appeals found that the
plaintiff intended to use the repair costs to show general damages,
i.e. the difference between the market value of the goods as war-
ranted and the market value of the goods as received.53 The court
48. Nelson, 370 S.E.2d at 736.
49. Id. at 737.
50. Id.
51. Mountaineer Contractors v. Mountain State Mack, 165 W. Va. 292, 268 S.E.2d 886 (1979).
52. Nelson, 370 S.E.2d at 737. The trial court in Nelson held that the plaintiff's attempt to
introduce the repair bills was in order to show "special circumstances." It is uncertain, however,
whether he meant "special circumstances" or "special damages." The West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals accepted the interpretation of both of the parties on appeal, and interpreted the trial court
to mean "special damages," which must be plead specifically in order for evidence proving such
damages to be admitted. Id. at 737 n.7.
53. Id. at 737.
1990]
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cited Mountdineer Contractors and held that repair bills could indeed
be used in this way.5 4 Mountaineer Contractors, however, supported
the use of -repair costs as proof of general damages by citing the
"special circumstances" provision of Chapter 46, Article 2, Section
714 of the West Virginia Code.?5 The Nelson court explained that
its holding in Mountaineer Contractors was not limited to "special
circumstances," and that when "special circumstances" do arise,
the whole damages formula can be replaced by whatever measure
of damages the court deems appropriate.
5 6
The Nelson court stated that "[ihe cost of repairs is strong ev-
idence of the difference between the value they would have had if
they had been as warranted [and the value of the goods as received]
.... In most cases [general] damages can be determined based on
... what it would cost to repair or replace." '5 7 The Nelson court
reversed the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of the repair
costs as evidence of general damages and remanded the case for
further proceedings on the issue of damages only.58
The significance of Nelson is that it allows the plaintiff's repair
costs to be used directly to show the difference between the market
value as warranted and the market value as received. Plaintiffs need
no longer plead repair costs as consequential or incidental damages
or rely on Mountaineer Contractors to introduce a plaintiff's repair
costs under some "special circumstances." In Nelson, the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals has recognized that repair costs are
indeed a good yardstick to measure the difference between market
values and has explicitly held that repair costs are admissible to
prove general damages under Chapter 46, Article 2, Section 714 of
the West Virginia Code.
54. Id.
55. Mountaineer Contractors, 165 W. Va. at 303, 268 S.E.2d at 893.
56. Nelson, 370 S.E.2d at 738 n.8. For proper examples of the use of special circumstances
provision in U.C.C. § 2-714, see Hirst v. Elgin Metal Casket, 438 F. Supp. 906 (D.C. Mont. 1977);
Baden v. Curtiss, 380 F. Supp. 243 (D.C. Mont. 1974); Wright v. T & B Auto Sales, 72 N.C. App.
449, 325 S.E.2d 493 (1985).
57. Nelson, 370 S.E.2d at 737 (quoting W. HAWKLAND, U.C.C. SERIEs § 2-714:04 (1984)).
58. Id. at 738.
(Vol. 92
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C. Comparison to Other Jurisdictions
1. Plaintiff's Testimony
The Nelson court's holding that the plaintiff's testimony as to
the value of goods received is admissible, but not sufficient to sup-
port a finding of the value of the goods, is consistent with the prior
cases in West Virginia 9 and with the general rule of other juris-
dictions. 60 In a 1984 case, Vreeman v. Davis,6t the Supreme Court
of Minnesota stated the general rule when it said "[a]n owner is
competent to express an opinion on the market value of his or her
property, and ordinarily any weakness in the foundation for that
opinion goes to its weight, not its admissibility. "62 Nelson made no
substantive change in the law in the area of admissibility of weight
of plaintiff's testimony as to the value of goods accepted.
2. Role of Repair Costs
Other jurisdictions also allow the use of repair costs to prove
the difference in market value received and market value as war-
ranted.63 In Winchester v. McCulloch Bros. Garage,64 the plaintiff
had purchased a Jeep from the defendant. Soon after the purchase,
the Jeep's drive shaft malfunctioned, and the plaintiff sued the de-
fendant for breach of warranty. The Supreme Court of Alabama
noted that "it is often difficult to ascertain the value of the goods
as delivered. For this reason, where the goods are repairable, cost
to repair is a useful measure of the difference in values. '65
59. See, e.g., Spencer v. Steinbrecher, 152 W. Va. 490, 164 S.E.2d 710 (1968); Royal Furniture
v. City of Morgantown, 164 W. Va. 400, 263 S.E.2d 878 (1980); Hardman Trucking v. Poling Truck-
ing, 346 S.E.2d 551 (V. Va. 1986).
60. See, e.g., Coyle Chevrolet v. Carrier, 397 N.E.2d 1283 (Ind. App. 1979); Tarter v. Monark
Boat Co., 430 F. Supp. 1290 (D.C. Mo. 1977); Vreeman v. Davis, 348 N.W.2d 756 (Minn. 1984);
Wharton, Aldhizer, & Weaver v. Savin Corp., 232 Va. 375, 350 S.E.2d 635 (1986).
61. 348 N.W.2d 756 (Minn. 1984).
62. Id. at 757.
63. See, e.g., Jones v. Abriani, 169 Ind. App. 556, 350 N.E.2d 635 (1976); Custom Automated
Mach. v. Penda Corp., 537 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Winchester v. McCulloch Bros. Garage,
388 So. 2d 927 (Ala. 1980).
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In Custom Automated Machinery v. Penda Corporation,6 6 the
plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of warranty. The plaintiff
purchased a thermoforming machine from the defendant which was
apparently not fit for its intended purpose. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that "[t]his
difference in value can be computed by reference to the costs of
repairing the goods so that they meet the warranty standards; i.e.,
the difference in value between goods as accepted and as warranted
equals the cost of repairs." 67 The same view is expressed in many
other cases from various jurisdictions around the country. 8
V. CONCLUSION
The decision made by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals in Nelson is neither a radical nor unheralded change in the
law of this state. However, the significance of Nelson is that it allows
repair costs to be used as proof of general damages under the implied
warranty of merchantability. The effect of the change will be to
make it easier for plaintiffs to show general damages. The change
is only a slight extension of the law and will not shake the foun-
dations of justice. It is in accord with the general spirit of protecting
the consumer and is also in line with the view from many other
jurisdictions. The only real effect of Nelson is to clear up ambiguity.
Before Nelson, it was unclear just how repair costs could be used
to show damages for breach of warranty. Now, on the other hand,
it is clear that repair costs can be used as evidence of the difference
in market values under the general damages formula in Chapter 46,
Article 2, Section 714 of the West Virginia Code.
It would also seem, from a public policy point of view, that the
change made by Nelson can also help plaintiffs recover for breach
of the implied warranty of merchantability when no other method
of showing damages is available. This change can only be seen as
a positive one, since the very purpose of the implied warranty of
66. 537 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
67. Id. at 84.
68. See, e.g., Fedders Corp. v. Boatright, 493 So. 2d 301 (Miss. 1986); Bendix Home Sys. v.
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merchantability is to protect the consumer. The Nelson ruling clar-
ifies the application of Chapter 46, Article 2, Section 714 of the
West Virginia Code, and thus increases the effect of the statute to
help consumers prove damages for breach of warranty. With its
decision in Nelson, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
took a logical and helpful step to clarify the application of a statute
to protect the consumers of this state.
Chad A. Cicconi
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